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OPINION 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Adekunle Adeolu was the part-owner and 
office manager of a tax preparation company that prepared 
fraudulent tax returns by encouraging taxpayers to claim false 
dependents.  Adeolu was ultimately convicted of conspiracy 
to defraud the United States and of aiding and abetting the 
preparation of materially false tax returns, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371 and 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).  At sentencing, the 
District Court applied the vulnerable victim sentencing 
enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) based upon 
Adeolu’s fraudulent use of young children’s personal 
information.  On appeal, Adeolu argues that the children were 
not vulnerable victims because they did not experience 
“actual” harm.  We write to clarify that a showing of actual 
harm is not required under the vulnerable victim sentencing 
enhancement.  Rather, our existing test for the application of 
this enhancement requires a “nexus” between the victim’s 
vulnerability and the crime’s success, a requirement clearly 
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met in this case.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
application of this enhancement and the sentence it imposed.1   
I. 
 Adeolu’s tax preparation company employed 
approximately fifteen people and prepared fraudulent tax 
returns in two ways: by selling the taxpayer an individual’s 
personal information to fraudulently claim as the taxpayer’s 
dependent; or, by suggesting that the taxpayer fraudulently 
claim a dependent that the taxpayer personally knew.2  
According to the District Court, the individuals who were 
fraudulently claimed as dependents ranged in age from one to 
eighteen years old, including a thirteen-year-old, nine-year-
old, six-year-old, and five-year-old child.  (App. 1111.)  At 
sentencing, the District Court applied the vulnerable victim 
enhancement after finding that Adeolu stole these individuals’ 
personal information in order to file fraudulent tax returns, 
                                              
 1 In affirming the sentence, we reject Adeolu’s 
challenge to the District Court’s application of the four-level 
leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) as well as 
his challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his 
sentence.   
 
 2 For example, Felicia Jones testified that she 
purchased a fraudulent dependent from a tax preparer at 
Adeolu’s office for $1,000.  Another individual, Lassey 
Mensah, testified that he purchased a dependent for $800.  
Additionally, during an undercover investigation, an 
undercover agent told Adeolu that she did not have any 
dependents, but Adeolu nonetheless suggested that if she 
could claim a minor as a dependent, it would eliminate her 
tax burden.  When the undercover agent later provided a 
minor’s information to be falsely listed as a dependent, 
Adeolu prepared the tax return, which generated a tax refund 
for the undercover agent.  During a separate investigation, 
another undercover agent told an employee that she did not 
have any dependents, so the employee suggested that she find 
one.  When the agent returned several hours later, the agent 
said she was claiming her friend’s child as a dependent, and 
an employee prepared her tax return listing this minor as her 
nephew.   
4 
 
that these individuals’ youth gave rise to their vulnerability, 
and that they experienced tangible and intangible harm.     
II. 
 Our review of the District Court’s legal interpretation 
of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary.  United States v. 
Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review the 
District Court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines for 
clear error.  Id.   
III. 
 On appeal, Adeolu argues that the vulnerable victim 
enhancement should not apply because the “minors did not 
suffer actual harm, such as loss of tax refund proceeds, a fine, 
or a negative mark on their credit score.”3  (Appellant Br. at 
36.)  Our Court, however, has never held that the vulnerable 
                                              
 3 Adeolu also argues that the minors cannot be 
considered vulnerable merely by virtue of their age.  See 
Appellant’s Br. at 33.  While “presumed vulnerabilities 
among broad classes of victims . . . are disfavored,” they are 
not prohibited, Zats, 298 F.3d at 188, and may be appropriate 
based on the facts of a particular case.  The District Court’s 
treatment of minors as a group is supported by the fact that 
minors as a class generally do not file their own tax returns 
(unless they are working), and are unlikely to check their tax 
status or monitor for identity theft.  See United States v. 
Crispo, 306 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding “class 
attributes can be sufficient if they make the finding of 
vulnerability beyond dispute” and thus generalizations were 
permitted with respect to a toddler’s ability to fend off a 
kidnapper).  Moreover, even if we concluded an 
individualized determination as to each individual’s 
vulnerability is preferred, the enhancement may be applied 
when there is a single vulnerable victim, and, as discussed 
herein, there was sufficient evidence from which the District 
Court could have concluded that a one-year-old child claimed 
as a dependent was “vulnerable” within the meaning of the 
enhancement.  We thus conclude that there was no error in 
the District Court’s finding of vulnerability across the group 
of affected minors in this case. 
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victim enhancement requires a showing of actual harm, 
whether financial or otherwise.4  Rather, our three-part test 
under United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 
1999), properly analyzes the “nexus” between a victim’s 
vulnerability and the success of the defendant’s criminal 
scheme, thereby encompassing any resulting harm to the 
victim and rendering an analysis of “actual” harm 
inconsequential. 
A. 
 The vulnerable victim enhancement states:  “If the 
defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the 
offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels.”  
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1).5  Unlike other enhancements, the 
vulnerable victim enhancement does not explicitly require a 
showing of harm.  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) 
(discussing actual loss and intended loss).  The application 
note to section 3A1.1(b)(1) explains that a “vulnerable 
victim” is someone who is: (1) “a victim of the offense of 
conviction and any conduct for which the defendant is 
accountable under 1.3 (Relevant Conduct)”; and (2) 
“unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental 
condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the 
criminal conduct.”  U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.  In light of 
these requirements, this Court applies a three-part test to 
determine the applicability of the vulnerable victim 
enhancement, addressing whether:  
                                              
 4 In this regard, our position is similar to the Second 
Circuit’s position on the vulnerable victim enhancement.  See 
United States v. Kimber, 777 F.3d 553, 564 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 170 (2015) (“We have never held that 
actual infliction of harm is a prerequisite to the application of 
a vulnerable victim adjustment.”). 
 
 
5 We have used the November 2010 version of this 
guideline, because this version was in effect at the time of 
Adeolu’s conviction in 2014.  Although some of our cases 
analyze an earlier version of this guideline, any difference is 
inconsequential and does not alter our analysis.  See Iannone, 
184 F.3d at 220 n.5 (noting that the guideline’s 1998 
amendment “does not affect our analysis”). 
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(1) the victim was particularly 
susceptible or vulnerable to the 
criminal conduct; (2) the 
defendant knew or should have 
known of this susceptibility or 
vulnerability; and (3) this 
vulnerability or susceptibility 
facilitated the defendant’s crime 
in some manner; that is, there was 
“a nexus between the victim’s 
vulnerability and the crime’s 
ultimate success.” 
Zats, 298 F.3d at 186 (quoting Iannone, 184 F.3d at 220).   
 The enhancement does not define the word “victim,” 
but a victim is commonly understood to be someone who is 
“taken advantage of.”  Victim, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1993).  This definition is consistent 
with our prior interpretation of the vulnerable victim 
enhancement.  In United States v. Monostra, we held that “the 
use of the words ‘susceptible’ and ‘vulnerable’ in § 3A1.1 
indicates that the enhancement is to be applied when the 
defendant has taken advantage of the victim’s weakness.”  
125 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 1997).  To determine whether a 
defendant has taken advantage of a vulnerable victim, we 
examine whether “there was ‘a nexus between the victim’s 
vulnerability and the crime’s ultimate success.’”  Iannone, 
184 F.3d at 220 (quoting Monostra, 125 F.3d at 190).  By 
requiring a “nexus” between the victim’s vulnerability and 
the defendant’s scheme, we assess whether a victim has been 
“taken advantage of” in a manner that facilitates the 
defendant’s scheme.  As such, an analysis of “actual” harm is 
inconsequential.  Any issue regarding the victim’s harm is 
already encompassed within our analysis of the nexus 
between a victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s success.   
 
 Indeed, “the purpose of § 3A1.1, as we see it, is simply 
to acknowledge that, while most crimes are committed for 
other motives, in many instances defendants know or should 
know of their victim’s particular vulnerability and are 
therefore more blameworthy for knowingly or even 
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negligently harming them.”  United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 
1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1997).  But a defendant is not more or 
less blameworthy for the purposes of this enhancement based 
on the amount of harm that a victim experiences.  Applying 
the enhancement in such a manner would create a disparity in 
the punishments for defendants who are more successful (and 
cause more harm) and those who are less successful, despite 
displaying similar depravity.  As the Second Circuit has 
explained, the interest in punishing a defendant’s depravity 
“is present regardless of whether a defendant who targets a 
vulnerable victim is ultimately successful; the ‘choice of 
victim demonstrates an extra measure of criminal depravity’ 
in either case.”  Kimber, 777 F.3d at 564 (quoting United 
States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1505 (2d Cir. 1992)).  
A contrary result would fail to punish a defendant’s 
reprehensible conduct and fail to protect vulnerable members 
of society by deterring future criminal conduct.  See Zats, 298 
F.3d at 188 (“Our objective is to provide extra deterrence for 
defendants who are especially likely to succeed in their 
criminal activities because of the vulnerability of their 
prey.”); Kimber, 777 F.3d at 564 (“The adjustment ‘reflect[s] 
the public interest in more severely punishing those whose 
choice of victim demonstrates an extra measure of criminal 
depravity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hershkowitz, 968 
F.2d at 1505)); United States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131, 144 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentencing judge should ‘focus not on the 
likelihood or extent of harm to the individual if the crime is 
successful, but on the extent of the individual’s ability to 
protect himself from the crime.’” (quoting United States v. 
O’Neil, 118 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 1997))).   
 
 In light of these policy considerations and our existing 
test requiring a “nexus” between the victim’s vulnerability 
and the defendant’s scheme, there is no need to require a 
separate showing of “actual” harm.6  See, e.g., United States 
                                              
 6 The application notes for the vulnerable victim 
enhancement also support our holding that a separate showing 
of actual harm is not required.  The application notes explain 
that “[t]he adjustment would apply, for example, in a fraud 
case in which the defendant marketed an ineffective cancer 
cure or in a robbery in which the defendant selected a 
handicapped victim.”  U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.  Although 
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v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419, 423-25 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(finding that reimbursed accountholders were not “victims” 
under the fraud enhancement because they suffered no 
financial loss, but affirming the application of the “vulnerable 
victim” enhancement without an explicit analysis of whether 
the accountholders experienced harm).  Therefore, we will 
continue to apply Iannone’s three-part test to determine the 
applicability of this enhancement.    
B. 
 We now turn to our review of the District Court’s 
application of the vulnerable victim enhancement, which we 
review for clear error.  Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 418.  First, we 
agree that the victims here were “particularly susceptible or 
vulnerable to the criminal conduct.”  Zats, 298 F.3d at 187 
(quoting Iannone, 184 F.3d at 220).  “Victims can be 
vulnerable for the reasons listed in the application note—age, 
physical or mental condition—or simply because one is 
‘otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.’”  
Id. at 187-88 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2).  To make 
this determination, we examine “the individual victims’ 
ability to avoid the crime rather than their vulnerability 
relative to other potential victims of the same crime.”  Id. at 
188 (quoting United States v. McCall, 174 F.3d 47, 51 (2d 
Cir. 1998)).  Here, the individuals’ youth gave rise to their 
vulnerability and their inability to protect against Adeolu’s 
                                                                                                     
this note highlights the difference between a vulnerable 
victim and the general population, the fraud example 
illustrates that focusing on whether a victim experienced 
harm would be misplaced.  There, the enhancement applied 
because the defendant “marketed an ineffective cancer cure” 
without regard for whether the victim suffered financial loss, 
physical harm, or even potential harm stemming from the 
defendant’s conduct.  This supports our understanding that 
courts should focus on the defendant’s exploitative conduct 
rather than the result of that conduct in determining the 
applicability of this enhancement.  See Iannone, 184 F.3d at 
220 (“[T]he note suggests that this enhancement is designed 
to apply where a defendant knowingly or recklessly exploits a 
victim’s vulnerability in order to facilitate his commission of 
the crime.”). 
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fraudulent scheme.  Indeed, our society routinely recognizes 
the need to protect minors’ personal information by requiring 
redactions of their names, birthdays, and Social Security 
numbers.  Given a child’s inability to guard against theft of 
personal information, we find that the first element of this test 
is satisfied.    
 Second, we also agree that Adeolu knew or should 
have known of the victims’ vulnerability.  Because their ages 
were integral to qualifying as dependents, Adeolu knew or 
should have known that at least one of the children who was 
fraudulently claimed as a dependent was vulnerable due to 
age and inability to protect against his conduct.  See id. at 190 
(“[T]he Government need not prove that every, or even most, 
of Zats’ victims were vulnerable or that he knew or should 
have known of the vulnerabilities in every case.  The 
language of the guideline requires only that ‘a victim of the 
offense was a vulnerable victim.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1))). 
 Third and finally, we find that there was a “nexus” 
between the victims’ vulnerability and the success of 
Adeolu’s fraudulent scheme.  Although the Sentencing 
Guidelines do not require that the defendant “target” the 
victim, “the enhancement may not be applied absent a 
showing that the victim’s vulnerability or susceptibility 
facilitated the defendant’s crime in some manner.”  Monostra, 
125 F.3d at 190.  Here, Adeolu profited from the sale of his 
victims’ personal information and falsely listed them as 
dependents because of their youth, showing that Adeolu took 
advantage of the minors’ vulnerability in a manner that 
facilitated his criminal scheme.  See id. at 191 (“The 
enhancement is applied not because the victim draws 
sympathy from us because of the infirmity, and we simply 
wish to express extra odium for the act.  It is also because the 
infirmity rendered the victim susceptible to the crime 
committed upon him.”).  Therefore, we will affirm the 
application of the vulnerable victim enhancement.7   
                                              
 7  We will also affirm the District Court’s application 
of the four-level leadership enhancement, which is applied 
“[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal 
activity that involved five or more participants or was 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s application of the vulnerable victim and leadership 
enhancements and Adeolu’s overall sentence. 
                                                                                                     
otherwise extensive.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).  We agree that 
testimony from an employee, Olugboyega “Remi” Fisher, 
credibly establishes that Adeolu was the organizer of 
fraudulent activity involving at least five participants. Lastly, 
we will affirm the substantive reasonableness of Adeolu’s 56-
month sentence.  See Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 418 (reviewing 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s overall sentence for 
abuse of discretion).  The District Court indeed considered 
mitigating factors in determining Adeolu’s sentence, such as 
his lack of criminal history, his familial and community 
support, and his intelligence.  Thus, we will affirm the 
entirety of Adeolu’s sentence.  
